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AGCHAIN: DEPLOYING A PUBLIC UTILITY BLOCKCHAIN TO
UNVEIL THE MISSING LINKS BETWEEN FOOD ORIGIN &
DESTINATION
Jacob D. Farrell*
Modern agriculture has stretched into an unintelligible supply
chain with a global reach, leaving consumers unable to make fully
informed decisions related to their food. Additionally, such
complexities confound adequate regulation. Blockchain technology,
a data system using a distributed ledger on a peer-to-peer network,
boasts various theoretical applications born of its ability to deliver
security via decentralization and other unique information
management strategies. In stark contrast to this technological
innovation, the regulatory mechanisms the United States deploys to
manage its supply chains lay stagnate. The antiquated and reactive
posture with which the United States regulates and controls its food
safety and supply is of particular significance. This Article explores
the untapped potential in blockchains as supply chain management
tools, capitalizing on data abundance to improve transparency for
regulators and consumers alike. Because the food supply is one of
the Nation’s most vital industries but is also one of the most
outdated, agriculture should be the first industry converted to a
blockchain system. Additional benefits to modernizing the United
States’ food supply chain include improved ethical transparency to
consumers and shielding companies as well as government agencies
from harmful cyberattacks. Because of the high underlying capital
infrastructure costs for implementing such a system, and because
blockchain infrastructure exhibits characteristics of a natural
monopoly, a regulated utility would be best suited to create this
agricultural blockchain: AgChain.
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INTRODUCTION
Agricultural supply chains have become intricate alongside the
globalization of commerce.1 The increasing complexity of this
1

Robyn Metcalfe, An Industrialized Global Food Supply Chain Threatens
Human Health – Here’s How to Improve It, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 5, 2019,
6:42 AM), https://theconversation.com/an-industrialized-global-food-supplychain-threatens-human-health-heres-how-to-improve-it-112803
[https://perma.cc/64YL-2WBT].
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system has plagued regulators and consumers alike with the evermore relevant question: Is this safe to eat?2 Unfortunately, this
question has become progressively more challenging to answer.
Dated oversight processes, risks posed by technologically advanced
warfare, and foodborne pathogens have illuminated the reality that
the United States is alarmingly unprepared to address a large-scale
compromise to its food supply.3
To provide more certainty surrounding the food supply, the
United States should deploy an agricultural blockchain (“AgChain”)
and regulate the blockchain as a public utility. AgChain possesses
many benefits that could enable regulators and consumers to answer
vital questions about their food. Because vulnerabilities in the food
supply are immediately pressing,4 the agricultural industry should
be the first U.S. industry to implement a blockchain solution.5 A
complex data storage network, such as AgChain, would share many
traits of a natural monopoly, like the electricity grid; thus, regulating
AgChain like a public utility is the best approach to incentivize
capital investment by reducing risks to investors.6 Natural
2

Id.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
4
See, e.g., FDA Investigated Multistate Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections
Linked to Romaine Lettuce from Yuma Growing Region, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/fda-investigatedmultistate-outbreak-e-coli-o157h7-infections-linked-romaine-lettuce-yumagrowing [https://perma.cc/T7HV-VQ3T] (Nov. 1, 2018) (describing a recent,
representative example of a supply chain vulnerability); see also TIMOTHY D.
LYTTON, OUTBREAK: FOODBORNE ILLNESS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FOOD
SAFETY 3 (2019) (calling for food regulatory reform in light of 48 million annual
illnesses from food contamination in the United States alone).
5
Other global supply chains could benefit from blockchain-based data
management. Essentially, any vital industry that involves sensitive inventory,
demanding transparency needs, or that is prone to cyberwarfare targeting from
international adversaries would greatly benefit from the numerous security and
transparency benefits inherent to blockchain. A comprehensive discussion of the
various industries likely to benefit from a blockchain system is outside of the
scope of this Article. Vital industries in the United States are characterized at
Critical Infrastructure Sectors, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC.
AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors [https://perma.cc/
8SP9-7LXV].
6
Natural Monopolies, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.investopedia
.com/terms/n/natural_monopoly.asp [https://perma.cc/N2AF-JNHT].
3
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monopolies can occur where high start-up costs are present or
powerful economies of scale create practical barriers for competitors
to enter the market.7 Similar to power providers on a regulated
electricity grid, AgChain would have a duty to serve anyone who
can pay, and agriculturalists and retailers participating in the supply
chain would act as ratepayers.8
This Article proposes that utility-based regulation is the best
approach to implementing a blockchain-based supply chain for
agriculture. Part II discusses the current state of the United States’
agricultural supply chain, demonstrating why change is necessary.
Part III proposes adopting a blockchain system to usher in the
digitalization of regulatory oversight and consumer safety. Part IV
discusses some of the potential issues facing the implementation of
AgChain. Finally, Part V addresses those potential issues by
proposing viable solutions, specifically, treating AgChain as a
regulated utility to incentivize investment.
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED
STATES
American agriculture is a valuable and complex machine with a
history as old as the United States itself.9 The industry is deeply
interconnected, encompassing a global system of producers,
distributors, retailers, and consumers.10 The original farm-to-table
model of agriculture has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity due to

7

Id. (“Natural monopolies can arise in industries that require unique raw
materials, technology, or similar factors to operate.”).
8
For a full discussion on utility regulation principles, see infra Part V.
9
See, e.g., Craig P. Raysor, From The Sword to the Pen: A History and Current
Analysis of U.S. Tobacco Marketing Regulations, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 497,
502–03 (2008) (discussing the export of 1.4 million pounds of tobacco annually
from the American colonies to London as early as 1640).
10
Louise Lucas et al., 20,000 Miles to the Plate, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/128a852e-7b64-11e2-8eb3-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/T43M-JZGM] (following the vast and complex market through
which one example of food, cod, must travel before being enjoyed by the
consumer).
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questionable practices within the global food industry;11 however,
farm-to-table still remains the exception, not the norm.12 Elongated
and unintelligible supply chains have caused serious concerns in the
international community, highlighted by numerous catastrophes:
horsemeat lasagna in the United Kingdom,13 infant deaths in China
from melamine-laced milk,14 and dangerously high antibiotic levels
in chicken from various fast-food chains in the United States.15
These concerns highlight that, although supply chains have grown
steadily over time, stoked by the hastening effects of globalization,
aging regulatory bodies have fallen behind.16
A. Antiquated and Reactive Agricultural Regulations Demand an
AgChain Solution
Although the size and scope of agriculture have evolved
significantly over the years, regulation of the industry has largely
remained unchanged.17 During the last half-century, the few newly
11

See, e.g., Dianna Heitz, Local Dining’s Fresh Options, POLITICO (Dec. 5,
2011, 10:47 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/12/local-dinings-freshoptions-069434 [https://perma.cc/G3WV-ZC69] (“[T]he first family has taken a
keen interest in healthful, sustainable and farm-fresh food.”); DARRYL BENJAMIN
& LYNDON VIRKLER, FARM TO TABLE: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO SUSTAINABLE
FOOD SYSTEMS FOR STUDENTS, PROFESSIONALS, AND CONSUMERS 33, 61–64
(2016).
12
See, e.g., Lucas et al., supra note 10 (“The idea you can check every supplier
and every ingredient they are supplying you with – it doesn’t compute. You can’t.
It is too enormous a task and at odds with what everyone wants, which is cheaper
food.”).
13
Pamela Kerschke-Risch, The Horsemeat Scandal: The Unknown Victims of
Economically Motivated Crime, 5 J. VICTIMOLOGY 63, 66–68 (2017).
14
Id. at 64.
15
See Lucas et al., supra note 10.
16
Philip K. Howard, Obsolete Law—The Solutions, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30,
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/03/obsolete-law-0151
-the-solutions/255141/ [https://perma.cc/WFK8-G6P9] (“The regulatory state has
taken a life of its own, insulated from democratic accountability by thick walls of
law . . . Want to do something different, like, say, balance the budget? Sorry, old
laws and mandates stand in the way.”).
17
See generally Sally Clarke, Farmers as Entrepreneurs: Regulation and
Innovation in American Agriculture during the Twentieth Century, 17 BUS. &
ECON. HIST. 207 (1988) (highlighting the history of American agricultural
regulation).
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adopted programs faced implementation delays that caused decades
to pass before the programs became useful.18 For example, a 2012
U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Press Release declared
an effort by the government to modernize poultry inspection.19 The
USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (“FSIS”) estimated that
25,000 illnesses per year would be prevented by screening for the
two most common pathogens.20 However, as of July 2020, FSIS
reports indicated that only 141 poultry plants had adopted the New
Poultry Inspection System (“NPIS”).21 This number of monitored
facilities is concerningly small considering that over 5,700 farming
families produce poultry products in North Carolina alone.22
Ultimately, less than 0.0007% of poultry farms in the country have
converted to NPIS in nearly a decade.23 The FSIS claims that the
agency only regulates 6,100 plants nationwide, likely due to its
limited constitutional authority to regulate the plants; however, this
number still only represents a 2.31% NPIS adoption rate for those
plants falling under federal jurisdiction.24 The low adoption rate of
18

See New Poultry Inspection System, FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (2020), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/
regulatory-compliance/haccp/haccp-based-inspection-models-project/himpstudy-plans-resources/npis-plants [https://perma.cc/L7A8-9TDQ] (indicating that
less than 300 poultry plants have requested to convert to the New Poultry
Inspection System); see also Press Release, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., USDA Seeks to Modernize Poultry Inspection in the United
States (Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2012/01/20/usdaseeks-modernize-poultry-inspection-united-states
[https://perma.cc/FJD6-E6UN]
(showing that the USDA adopted the NPIS initiative in 2012).
19
Press Release, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., supra note 18.
20
Id.
21
See id. (showing a chart of all the poultry plants falling under USDA
regulation that have requested and also converted to the NPIS).
22
Poultry Facts, N.C. POULTRY FED’N, https://www.ncpoultry.org/facts/
facts.cfm [https://perma.cc/6AUN-TM3Q] (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
23
USDA Poultry Production Data, NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. (May 2015), https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nasspoultry-stats-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZQ8-X4E9].
24
Press Release, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., supra note 18; see also
Thomas E. Travis, Horne v. USDA: The Takings Clause, the Commerce Clause,
and the “World’s Most Outdated Law”, 7 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RES. L.
399, 419 (2015) (providing a discussion of Commerce Clause limitations on the
regulatory authority of the USDA).
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NPIS illustrates the substantial portions of the agricultural industry
that remain ineffectively regulated by federal oversight and also
shows the problematically slow rate at which new regulations
permeate agriculture.
Twenty-one states rely almost exclusively on federal inspection
systems to inform the development of meat processing regulation in
their states, instead of relying on state inspection systems of their
own.25 Critics of federal regulation contend that continued
deregulation of agriculture is the best approach to reforming the
industry.26 However, this “less is more” approach is concerning for
two key reasons: (1) technological development has spotlighted
striking vulnerabilities in the agricultural industry; and, (2) the
danger of hazards in the U.S. food supply is too great for the federal
government to ignore because states are ill-equipped and
unmotivated to solve the problem themselves.27
National security also calls for federal regulation of the Nation’s
food supply.28 Attacking an enemy’s food sources—to weaken the
enemy and promote internal political pressure to surrender29—is a
25

See Elizabeth R. Rumley & James Wilkerson, Meat Processing Laws in the
United States: A State Compilation, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR.,
https://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/meatprocessing/
[https://perma.cc/L8H2-TCDC].
26
See Jon Lauck, After Deregulation: Constructing Agricultural Policy in the
Age of “Freedom to Farm”, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 3, 44 (2000).
27
See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a
“Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 304 (1997) (explaining
how federalism and state-controlled environmental regulatory regimes can
prompt a race to lower state standards in order to cut costs for prospective business
and increase the state’s tax base).
28
See Food and Agriculture Sector, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC.
AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/food-and-agriculture-sector [https://perma.cc
/6TTH-J9YP] (counting the Food and Agriculture Sector among the other Critical
Infrastructure Sectors and stating that agriculture accounts for approximately onefifth of the Nation’s economy).
29
See, e.g., The Battle of the Atlantic: Why Britain Almost Lost to Hitler’s Uboats, HISTORYEXTRA, BBC HIST. MAG. (May 27, 2020, 7:15 PM),
https://historyextra.com/period/second-world-war/did-britain-almost-lose-battleatlantic-ww2-athenia-sinking/ [https://perma.cc/5RFA-HBL3] (recounting the
Battle of the Atlantic during World War II where, because Britain imported some
70% of its food supply, the decimation of its shipping lanes almost forced British
submission to Nazi Germany).
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military strategy that dates back to Sun Tzu in the fifth century
B.C.30 While many Americans imagine that wars occur far from
home, few realize that the United States is engaging in ongoing
cyberwarfare with several technologically advanced countries and
is subject to countless attacks every day.31 American companies,32
including agricultural firms, regularly fall victim to these attacks.33
The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”)
within the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has
acknowledged the vital nature of agriculture in American
30

SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 21 (1910), http://www.artofwarsuntzu.com
/Art%20of%20War%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT62-RJZQ].
31
See Tal Axelrod, Texas Department of Agriculture Website Features ProIran Image After Cyberattack, THE HILL (Jan. 8, 2020, 4:02 PM),
https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/477408-texas-department-ofagriculture-website-featured-pro-iran-image-after [https://perma.cc/E2BL-4C4S]
(“Attempted cyber attacks from Iran against Texas agency websites are occurring
about 10,000 per minute.”); OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL CYBER
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-CyberStrategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XPH-BY27] (“Pillar III Preserve Peace Through
Strength . . . Objective: Identify, counter, disrupt, degrade, and deter behavior in
cyberspace that is destabilizing and contrary to national interests, while preserving
United States overmatch in and through cyberspace.”); Robert A. Norton & Scott
Algeier, Food and Agriculture Are Critical Infrastructures but also Domains of Future
War, FOOD SAFETY MAG. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.foodsafety
magazine.com/enewsletter/food-and-agriculture-are-critical-infrastructures-but-alsodomains-of-future-war/ [https://perma.cc/6YHU-LN5C] (“[T]he U.S. also is reported to
have launched cyberattacks against Iranian missile systems.”).
32
Significant Cyber Incidents, CTRS. FOR STRATEGIC INT’L STUD.,
https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyberincidents [https://perma.cc/VD2E-DPDZ] (Sept. 2020).
33
See Mark Niesse, Malware Disables Georgia Agriculture Department
Website, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state-regional-govt--politics/malware-disables-georgia-agriculture-departmentwebsite/97bicqeIIfhlWcwRZEuwiP/ [https://perma.cc/8N3H-PB2L]; see also
Laurie Bedord, Midwest Agriculture Is a Prime Target for Theft of Intellectual
Property and Cyber Attacks, SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.agriculture.com/content/cybersecurity-is-not-just-a-big-cityproblem [https://perma.cc/25UD-H4SK] (“In 2016, Mo Hailong, a lawful,
permanent resident and employee of a China-based seed company, was convicted
for his role in a long-term conspiracy to steal trade secrets from Iowa-based
DuPont Pioneer and Monsanto and to provide that technology to China.”).
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geopolitical security. In recent guidance, CISA included food and
agriculture in its listing of “critical infrastructure sectors whose
assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are
considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security.”34 The
United States’ antiquated and dilapidated regulatory systems expose
millions to possible victimization if hackers deliberately attack the
national food supply.35
Increasing technology has enhanced the ability to globalize
markets, including agriculture.36 Unfortunately, fields and fisheries
far from American homes critically hamper domestic consumers’
and regulators’ capacity to exercise meaningful scrutiny over food
characteristics and quality.37 Different countries observe divergent
norms relating to genetically modified organisms,38 pest control,39
and labor practices.40 Although technology has benefited the food
industry, countries’ differing norms illustrate that technology’s
34

Critical Infrastructure Sectors, supra note 5.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (“CSIS”) maintains a
record of confirmed successful hacks since 2003. While many government
agencies in the United States experience hundreds of hacking attempts every
minute, few know the magnitude of successful hacking attempts unless the hacks
make notoriety through news outlets. At the time of publication, the CSIS’s report
was a 55-page document with hundreds of successful hacks, including only those
incidents the CSIS deemed “significant.” See Significant Cyber Events, CTRS. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/210129_Significant_Cyber_Events.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3MG-X5NS].
36
Lucas et al., supra note 10 (illustrating how globalization has revolutionized
food supply chains).
37
See, e.g., Kerschke-Risch, supra note 13, at 66–68 (providing an example
where horsemeat not fit for human consumption was discovered in beef products).
38
Layla Katiraee, A Look at GMO Policies in Different Nations, BIOLOGY
FORTIFIED (July 6, 2015), https://biofortified.org/2015/07/a-look-at-gmopolicies-in-different-nations/ [https://perma.cc/4GXG-S6YA].
39
Nathan Donley, The USA Lags Behind Other Agricultural Nations in
Banning Harmful Pesticides, 18 ENV’T. HEALTH 44, 54 (2019).
40
Child Labour in Agriculture, U.N. INT’L LAB. ORG. (Sept. 2017),
http://ilo.org/ipec/areas/Agriculture/lang--en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/H3BKPTUX] (“In many countries child labour is mainly an agricultural issue.
Worldwide 60 percent of all child labourers in the age group 5-17 years work in
agriculture, including farming, fishing, aquaculture, forestry, and livestock. This
amounts to over 98 million girls and boys.”).
35
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advancements have also perpetuated numerous harms.
Domestically, the deep implantation of technology into agriculture,
often coined “precision agriculture,” is a tempting target for
hacking.41 Further, government systems are regularly subject to
hacking and ransomware attacks,42 and these cyberattacks do not
include social engineering and its potentially devastating effects.43
Compared to the rest of the world, most consumers in the United
States rarely question their continued access to food44 or whether
their food is safe to eat.45 However, foodborne pathogen outbreaks
in the United States are relatively common.46 The 2018 E. coli
outbreak in romaine lettuce supplies is just one example.47 The
41

John Farley, Precision Agriculture Is ‘Ripe for the Picking’ by Hackers,
GALLAGHER,
https://www.ajg.com/us/news-and-insights/2020/feb/precisionagriculture-ripe-for-the-picking-by-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/NZ7G-PF4E] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2021) (providing a list of potential scenarios where precision
agriculture could be subject to hacking, whereby one example states, “[a] farmer
plants hundreds of acres of corn across multiple counties and uses remote weather
stations with soil moisture sensors connected to smart watering systems to feed a
subsurface drip irrigation system. If one or more of the soil moisture sensors is
maliciously hacked, and the sensor indicates that watering is continuously needed
when it is not, the automated watering system could flood the fields.”).
42
David Sanger et al., Scope of Russian Hacking Becomes Clear: Multiple U.S.
Agencies Were Hit, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/
politics/russia-hack-nsa-homeland-security-pentagon.html
[https://perma.cc/WTD5-U923] (Jan. 5, 2021).
43
Steven Thomason, People—The Weak Link in Security, 13 GLOB. J. COMPUT.
SCI. & TECH. NETWORK, WEB & SEC. 7, 7 (2013) (“The weakest link in any
security plan or implementation is a human.”). Social engineering is the
exploitation of human aspects of systems to gain access and compromise integrity.
See id.
44
See Who Are the World’s Food Insecure? Identifying the Risk Factors of
Food Insecurity Around the World, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RSCH. SERV.
(June 3, 2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2019/june/who-are-theworld-s-food-insecure-identifying-the-risk-factors-of-food-insecurity-aroundthe-world/ [https://perma.cc/F6PT-C5ME].
45
See id.
46
Burden of Foodborne Illness: Findings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodborne-estimates.
html [https://perma.cc/G9RP-T5QX] (Nov. 5, 2018) (“CDC estimates that each
year roughly 1 in 6 Americans (or 48 million people) gets sick, 128,000 are
hospitalized, and 3,000 die of foodborne diseases.”).
47
FDA Investigated Multistate Outbreak of E. coli, supra note 4.
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outbreak caused 210 illnesses, 96 hospitalizations, and 5 deaths.48
Additionally, when foodborne pathogens threaten the population,
ill-equipped oversight systems result in overly broad recalls, causing
supermarkets and restaurants to throw out uninfected food in an
abundance of caution.49 The 2018 E. coli outbreak resulted in a
concerning $71 million shortfall in sales,50 highlighting that this
current system of addressing foodborne pathogens is wasteful and
irresponsible, thereby compounding the United States’ already
outrageous food waste problem.51
Further aggravating this economically burdensome process is
the reactive nature by which the United States’ Centers for Disease
Control (“CDC”) initiates recalls.52 When a human infection is
finally detected, clinical laboratories compile information regarding

48

Id.
See Jamie Ducharme, You’re Not Imagining It: Food Recalls Are Getting
More Common. Here’s Why, TIME (Jan. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://time.com/5504355/food-recalls-more-common/ [https://perma.cc/4EKGKQ5Q] (explaining that “the vast majority of recalls are precautionary and not
linked to any illness” (quotations omitted)).
50
Kate Taylor, Romaine Lettuce Sales Are Down More Than $71 Million So
Far This Year As The Industry Has Been Pummeled With Food-Poisoning
Outbreaks — And Things Are About to Get Worse, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 21, 2018,
11:28 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/e-coli-outbreaks-drag-romainelettuce-sales-down-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/B2CC-NYQL].
51
Food Waste FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.usda.gov/
foodwaste/faqs [https://perma.cc/R8WE-VBVU] (last visited Sept. 14, 2020)
(citing a 2010 USDA estimate that food loss and waste occur largely at the retail
and consumer levels, accounting for 31% of the food supply, 133 billion pounds
of food, and approximately $162 billion in lost revenue).
52
The CDC provides a description of its surveillance process and highlights the
challenges connected to foodborne disease reporting through, what it calls, the
“burden of illness pyramid” model. The reactive nature for the surveillance and
recall process is demonstrated by the triggering event: exposure to the general
population. Because the CDC and FDA have limited capability to sample the
entire national food supply, the majority of recalls are initiated through this post
hoc process. For more discussion on the CDC’s “active” laboratory surveillance,
see FoodNet Surveillance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/surveillance.html
[https://perma.cc/YZ6J-6FJL]
(last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
49
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the infection into a database called FoodNet,53 designed to recognize
year-to-year trends in illness.54 Yet FoodNet only surveils fifteenpercent of the United States’ population55 and carries two functional
flaws that utterly detract from its effectiveness.56 First, FoodNet
assumes that individuals infected by foodborne pathogens will seek
medical attention and have the means to do so;57 furthermore,
FoodNet relies on hospital staff to properly collect and input data
for analysis.58
Second, FoodNet functions reactively, doing little to intercept
contaminated food prior to consumption and thus fails to prevent
illness from occurring in the first place.59 If a simultaneous, largescale outbreak were to occur due to a viral mutation with increased
latency, countless victims worldwide could become infected before
a government notification is ever sent to the public.60 In light of the
aggressive rate at which SARS-CoV2 (“COVID-19”) spread across

53

An interested reader can explore the current statistics compiled by the CDC
on FoodNet Fast, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/index.html [https://perma.cc/D3QF-KF2U] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2020).
54
Kyler Massner, New Kid on The Block: How Blockchain Can Improve the
United States Food Sector, 24 DRAKE J. OF AGRIC. L. 341, 361 (2019).
55
Foodborne Disease Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet), CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/foodnetfast.html [https://perma.cc/8XZD-LRDU] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
See id.
59
See id.
60
See generally Samuel H. Speck & Don Ganem, Viral Latency and Its
Regulation: Lessons from the Gammaherpesviruses, 8 CELL HOST MICROBE 100,
100 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2914632/ [https://
perma.cc/K922-UXU2] (describing “latency” as the ability of a virus to lie
dormant before becoming active and causing symptoms); see also Paul M.
Lieberman, Epigenetics and Genetics of Viral Latency, 19 CELL HOST &
MICROBE 619, 619 (2016), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S1931312816301445 [https://perma.cc/42VB-RRSX] (“Latency can range from
selective viral gene expression with partial replication to a complete quiescence
with no detectable viral gene expression or replication.”).
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the globe, this possible outcome has never been more salient than
the present.61
B. A Cautionary Case Study of COVID-19
COVID-19 has proven to be an exceptionally resilient and
persistent virus, disrupting almost every facet of society.62 However,
its repercussions on agriculture and the global food supply have
received less press recognition despite their concerning
implications.63 For example, news outlets reported that frozen food
imported to China from Brazil tested positive for the virus.64
Although the CDC claims that the likelihood of contracting the virus
from food products and packaging is low,65 the CDC’s
understanding of the virus has continuously evolved.66 Regardless,
61

Timeline: WHO’s COVID-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactivetimeline [https://perma.cc/6JD9-9GKR] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
62
See Signe Smith Jervelund & Terje Andreas Eikemo, The Double Burden of
COVID-19, 49 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1, 2 (2021) (“The corona crisis
represents a double burden for most disadvantaged groups in our societies. They
are not only hit harder by the virus itself, but they are also suffering most of the
social and economic consequences of lockdowns in terms of job loss, social
isolation, reduced household income and reduced access to general healthcare due
to the healthcare systems being under pressure, leading to deteriorated health
conditions for people with chronic conditions.”).
63
See Roxanne Liu et al., Chinese Cities Find Coronavirus in Frozen Food
Imports, WHO Downplays Infection Risk, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2020, 5:52 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-food/chinese-citiesfind-coronavirus-in-frozen-food-imports-who-downplays-infection-riskidUSKCN259330 [https://perma.cc/DL82-NQPA].
64
Id.; Bruce Y. Lee, Can You Get Covid-19 Coronavirus from Food? Frozen
Chicken Wings Test Positive, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2020, 10:12 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2020/08/14/can-you-get-covid-19coronavirus-from-food-frozen-chicken-wings-test-positive/#392a59a4511e
[https://perma.cc/4HFU-8CXA].
65
Food and Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/dailylife-coping/food-and-COVID-19.html [https://perma.cc/4JZW-BWPF] (Dec. 31,
2020).
66
See Modes of Transmission of Virus Causing COVID-19: Implications for
IPC Precaution Recommendations, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 29, 2020),
who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-
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the agricultural industry should reflect on COVID-19 as a
cautionary tale, demonstrating the potential effects if a similarly
devastating virus could be transmitted through food. In response to
reports of the contaminated imports, China-based officials replied,
“It is hard to say at which stage the frozen chicken got infected.”67
The inability of officials to pinpoint the cause of contamination
suggests these products might have sat on shelves unnoticed for
extended periods of time.68 COVID-19 also crippled food
processing, distribution, and packaging by incapacitating
workforces.69
The potential risks posed by foodborne pathogens are staggering
and would devastate the world;70 thus, creating a workable solution
using modern technology is a vital necessity. Given the
insufficiency of inspection, regulatory oversight, and public
notification for contaminated food, the United States’ agricultural
industry must pivot to a technologically modern posture,
abandoning reactivity in exchange for proactivity and adopting
AgChain to make agriculture more resilient and efficient.

causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations
[https://perma.cc/4UW3-NUGD] (claiming COVID-19 was not likely airborne,
but individuals should observe airborne precautions in certain circumstances). But
see Lidia Morawska & Donald K. Milton, It Is Time to Address Airborne
Transmission of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), 71 OXFORD ACADEMIA
2311, 2311 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciaa939 [https://perma.cc/Q2CW8EZS] (urging the scientific community to reassess assumptions that COVID-19
is not airborne).
67
Liu et al., supra note 63.
68
See id.
69
Dianne Gallagher & Pamela Kirkland, Meat Processing Plants Across the US
Are Closing Due to the Pandemic. Will Consumers Feel the Impact?, CNN BUS.,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/26/business/meat-processing-plantscoronavirus/index.html [https://perma.cc/RJ9J-ADJS] (Apr. 27, 2020, 8:43 AM)
(“Beef processing in the US was down 27%, and pork processing was down
almost 20%, compared to this time last year, according to USDA data.”).
70
See generally Damir Huremovic, A Brief History of Pandemics (Pandemics
Throughout History), in PSYCHIATRY OF PANDEMICS (2019) (surveying the causes
of many historical pandemics and noting several were likely the result of poor
hygiene and food handling).
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III. BLOCKCHAIN WILL PROMOTE CYBER SECURITY,
REGULATORY EASE, AND TRANSPARENCY
Insufficient data security, reliability, and privacy on the internet
are well-illustrated by “The Byzantine Generals’ Problem.”71 In this
problem, two or more geographically separated generals attempt to
coordinate an attack against a strong enemy army.72 These generals
must communicate, but the generals grapple with the risk of being
betrayed by another general, or their couriers being intercepted by
the enemy.73 How are the generals supposed to plan an attack when
compromised communication, causing poor coordination, would
mean inevitable demise? These issues also arise when data is
transmitted over the internet, where vital or highly confidential
information is subject to compromise at any point along its journey
to the intended recipient.74 How should data authenticity, reliability,
and accessibility be promoted in an age when technology permeates
so deeply into the social fabric?75 How can that validated data
subsequently be used to best benefit society, national security, and
agriculture? By capitalizing on blockchain’s inherent security and
transparency,76 consumers, farmers, and regulators alike stand to
71
See NATALYA FEDOTOVA & LUCA VELTRI, BYZANTINE GENERALS PROBLEM
IN THE LIGHT OF P2P COMPUTING 1, 2–3 (2006).
72

district0x Network, The Byzantine Generals Problem – An Intro to
Blockchain, YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AmNgqJETQg [https://perma.cc/W2FW-F8YS] (“The blockchain uses a
distributed ledger, which functions like the distributed attack. Inputs to the ledger
(like the attack messages) must be trusted. Much like the troops surrounding the
castle, how can a network trust the other members and ensure that the messages
are valid? Here is how: All participating members must agree on every message
that is transmitted. If a member is corrupt or the message is corrupt - then the
message will be resisted, and the network will not be affected.”).
73
Id.
74
See id.
75
Madeleine Hillyer, How Has Technology Changed - and Changed Us - in the
Past 20 Years?, WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 18, 2020) https://www.weforum.org
/agenda/2020/11/heres-how-technology-has-changed-and-changed-us-over-thepast-20-years/ [https://perma.cc/2UC3-RQDS] (“Since the dotcom bubble burst
back in 2000, technology has radically transformed our societies and our daily
lives.”).
76
Tiago M. Fernández-Caramés & Paula Fraga-Lamas, A Review on the Use of
Blockchain for the Internet of Things, 6 IEEE ACCESS 32979, 32979, 32981
(2018).
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gain.77 AgChain would operate solely as a data management service,
satisfying the logistical needs of farmers, supermarkets, regulators,
and consumers.
A. A Primer on Blockchain Benefits: Security Through
Decentralization and Historically-Based Encryption
Blockchain is a computing tool that functions as a “distributed
ledger” and shares data stored on the ledger with the users on a
network, known as a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) network.78 P2Ps operate
by making all users equipotent, as access to information on the
system is a commonly shared privilege for users.79 The “block” in
blockchain describes the nature in which data is stored, accessed,
and encrypted on the network.80 Information stored in blocks is
regularly re-encrypted on the network by blockchain miner nodes,
which are servers tasked with adding transaction records to the block
and time stamping them.81 Hash functions facilitate digital
signatures and link the blocks in a chain in the proper order.82

77
See infra Part III.B (discussing the practical applications for a blockchain
integrated agricultural supply chain).
78
Id.
79
See Silvana Castano et al., Ontologies and Matching Techniques for Peerbased Knowledge Sharing 177, 177 (2003) (explaining that in Helios, a program
designed to work on a P2P network, “peers are equipotential in terms of
functionalities and capabilities”).
80
See Fernández-Caramés & Fraga-Lamas, supra note 76, at 32982 (describing
the data being ordered and packed into timestamped blocks by miner nodes).
81
See id. at 32981 (“Every node of the network receives two keys: a public key,
which is used by the other users for encrypting the messages sent to a node, and a
private key, which allows a node to read such messages. Therefore, two different
keys are used, one for encrypting and another for decrypting. In practice, the
private key is used for signing blockchain transactions (i.e., to approve such
transactions), while the public key works like a unique address.”); see also Jake
Frankenfield, Block Time, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
b/block-time-cryptocurrency.asp [https://perma.cc/SB85-VV22] (Nov. 8, 2019)
(noting the theoretical ten-minute block time on Bitcoin’s network compared to
the theoretical twenty second block time for Ethereum’s network).
82
Tiago M. Fernández-Caramés & Paula Fraga-Lamas, Towards PostQuantum Blockchain: A Review on Blockchain Cryptography Resistant to
Quantum Computing Attacks, 8 IEEE ACCESS J. 21091, 21093 (2020).
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While blockchains themselves are complex network programs,
two features make the technology an appealing option for
revolutionizing the agricultural supply chain and its regulatory
oversight:
(1)
historically-based
encryption
and
(2)
83
decentralization.
1. Historically-Based Encryption Promotes Resiliency
Historically-based encryption allows for an ever-changing
cipher upon which new blocks in a blockchain are encrypted.84 This
dynamic encryption directly addresses the risk of data being
manipulated or falling into the wrong hands, which is more common
for centralized data on servers accessed over the internet.85 By
creating a new block and thereby re-encrypting data at regular
intervals, a would-be hacker is thwarted from tampering with the
data by the mere passage of time.86 By the time the hacker might
have made progress to crack a cipher to access information on the
blockchain, the data block is closed, a new one opens, and the cipher
hash changes based on the newly closed block by adding the hash
value of the preceding block.87 This “hashing” process refers back
to the history of the blockchain to create the cipher, or encryption
consensus protocol, for the new block.88 Applying historical data in
83

See Fernández-Caramés & Fraga-Lamas, supra note 76, at 32979, 32982
(“[T]he blockchain nodes verify that the broadcast block contains valid
transactions and that it references the previous block of the chain by using the
corresponding hash . . . [I]f both conditions are verified successfully, the nodes
add the block to their chain, updating the transactions.”).
84
See Massner, supra note 54, at 348–49 (describing cryptographic hash
functions, which determine the difficulty of the hashing process and thus secure
the information on a block as valid); see also Frankenfield, supra note 81.
85
Id.
86
See Fernández-Caramés & Fraga-Lamas, supra note 76, at 32980–82.
87
See Rui Zhang & Rui Xue, Security and Privacy on Blockchain, 1 ACM
COMPUTING SURVS. 1, 3–4 (2019) (“[A] block also maintains the hash value of
the entire block itself, which can be seen as its cryptographic linkage, plus the
hash value of its preceding block, which serves as a cryptographic linkage to the
previous block in the blockchain.”); Frankenfield, supra note 81.
88
See Zhang & Xue, supra note 87, at 4 (“Those nodes that are miners will
collect transactions into a block, verify transactions in the block, and broadcast
the block and its verification using a consensus protocol (a.k.a., Proof of Work)
to get approval from the network. When other nodes verify that all transactions
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order to access present data protects the integrity of all previous
blocks in the chain,89 effectively preserving the data stored on the
blockchain in a way that is “immutable” and thus resistant to
manipulation by potential hackers.90
Cryptocurrency is based on the blockchain system 91 and can be
extremely valuable.92 At the time of this Article, a single Bitcoin was
priced at approximately $55,201.5493 Bitcoin’s high value leaves
hackers with plenty of financial incentive to hack and modify the
blockchain’s code to dishonestly allocate coins to themselves;
however, hackers have yet to prevail.94
Similarly, substantial incentives exist for enemies of the United
States or agriculturalists facing lawsuits to attempt to manipulate the
data on AgChain.95 By manipulating the stored data, hackers could
theoretically enable contaminated food to pass undetected or remove
evidence of poor food stewardship entirely; however, similar to
cryptocurrency hackers, AgChain hackers would be unsuccessful in
their attempts. By deploying historically based encryption via
hashing in the AgChain, agricultural technology companies would
avoid the hacks and ransomware attacks that previously plagued the
industry.96

contained in the block are valid, the block can be added to the blockchain.”). This
process can be made even more secure using “Hash pointers” and “Merkle trees,”
but delving into the potential variations of blockchain encoding is beyond the
scope of this Article. For further discussion on these and other concepts within
blockchain, see id. at 2–5.
89
Id. at 3.
90
Id. at 8.
91
Id. at 1.
92
See e.g., COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/price/bitcoin [https://perma.
cc/UPB2-YR4A?type=image] (last visited Oct. 10, 2021) (demonstrating the
market value of a single Bitcoin in October 2021).
93
Id.
94
Can a Cryptocurrency Like Bitcoin Get Hacked or Shutdown?, BITPANDA
ACAD., https://www.bitpanda.com/academy/en/lessons/can-a-cryptocurrencylike-bitcoin-get-hacked-or-shut-down/ [https://perma.cc/D7B4-LZV5] (last
visited Mar. 3, 2021) (explaining why Bitcoin is often deemed “hack-proof”).
95
For discussion of the cyber vulnerability of agriculture, see supra Part II.A.
96
See Massner, supra note 54, at 362–63.
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2. Decentralization Promotes Validity and Transparency
Another mechanism blockchains deploy to promote security is a
“distributed ledger,” which decentralizes control of the blockchain’s
information.97 For example, each computer running the blockchain
acts as a node in cryptocurrency, subjecting each new block to a
rigorous checks-and-balances analysis against every other node
operating the blockchain.98 In this system of data validation, also
called a “proof-of-work” model, majority rules, and the newly
adopted history of a blockchain is whatever the majority deems its
history to be when the hashing interval ends.99 For a hack to be
successful, not only would a bad actor need to “crack” the cipher,
but the hacker would also need to make identical changes to the
blockchain’s data on a majority of the nodes holding the ledger.100
Advances in data storage and the high-speed wireless
connectivity of devices have made the era coined “Internet of
Things” (“IoT”) a modern-day reality.101 Cloud-based storage is still
a widely used intermediary for devices to communicate; however,
devices are much more adept at simply talking directly to one
another.102 As Illustration A103 in the appendix demonstrates, the
97
See Can a Cryptocurrency Like Bitcoin Get Hacked or Shutdown?, supra
note 94.
98
See id.
99
See id. (explaining a 51% attack as requiring a majority of the network’s
mining power to be compromised by the hacker); see also XINLE YANG ET AL.,
EFFECTIVE SCHEME AGAINST 51% ATTACK ON PROOF-OF-WORK BLOCKCHAIN
WITH HISTORY WEIGHTED INFORMATION 261 (2019) (“[A] block is generated and
broadcasted to the P2P network. Depending on different varieties of protocol, peer
nodes always accept the longest chain or the chain with the largest total difficulty
repeatedly to continuously expand the blockchain. The proof-of-work model
utilizes this mechanism to determine which node has the right to seal a block. This
process is also called mining.”).
100
See Can a Cryptocurrency Like Bitcoin Get Hacked or Shutdown?, supra
note 94 (“This means that a majority of 51% could potentially alter a blockchain’s
distributed ledger in a way that double spending (execution of the same
transaction multiple times) would be enabled. This situation, however, is
extremely difficult to achieve and highly unlikely to happen.”).
101
Fernández-Caramés & Fraga-Lamas, supra note 76, at 32979.
102
Id. (stating that Machine-to-Machine connections will grow from 780
million in 2016 to 3.3 billion by 2021).
103
Id. at 32980.

142

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 23: 1

complexity of the IoT has increased over time.104 The IoT further
reinforces the strength of AgChain because the IoT increases the
possible nodes available to promote the decentralization of the
blockchain.105
Although the presence of technology throughout the world is
commonly recognized, the IoT is critical in unlocking AgChain’s
full potential.106 Using sensors throughout the agricultural supply
chain increases effectiveness by promoting real-time data
collection.107 For example, imagine that a bag of roasted, arabica
coffee beans is shipped from Brazil to Seattle. When those beans are
loaded into a shipping container for sea-based transport, a radio
frequency identifier (“RFID”) reader recognizes and catalogs the
coffee beans’ information using an RFID chip in the bag holding the
beans.108 That RFID chip includes the history of that particular batch
of beans up until that point in time, such as which farm grew the
product, who handled the product, and the temperature at which the
product was stored.109 Shipping containers, semi-trucks, and cargo
bays at grocery stores could all implement this RFID technology,
providing sensors to record and report transit data, such as duration,
104

Id.
See id. at 32980–81.
106
See Konstantinos Christidis & Michael Devetsikiotis, Blockchains and
Smart Contracts for the Internet of Things, 4 IEEE ACCESS 2292, 2298 (2016)
(discussing the usefulness of blockchains in the IoT through examples).
107
Id. at 2299 (“Assume that every stakeholder carries a smart tracker with (a)
a BLE radio, (b) a GSM or LTE radio so that it can connect to the Internet, (c) an
installed blockchain client. A similar tracker is also mounted to the container.
When the two stakeholders meet and the container is also present, for example at
point A, the devices of the stakeholders can send signed transactions to the
blockchain automatically without any user input, and the process can move to the
next stage as soon as the required tokens have been exchanged.”).
108
This hypothetical scenario is loosely based on an existing RFID agri-food
supply management system in China, which aims to incorporate blockchain. See
Fernández-Caramés & Fraga-Lamas, supra note 76, at 32983.
109
Much like the RFID chips often embedded into credit cards or anti-theft
devices in clothing tags, the information stored on these RFID tags need only be
a unique identifier to which attributions of other data may be made. See, e.g.,
Kimberly M. Wilmoth, RFID Tags Used to Track Produce Freshness from Farm
to Store, FARMPROGRESS (Sept. 8, 2014) https://www.farmprogress.com/
vegetables/rfid-tags-used-track-produce-freshness-farm-store
[https://perma.cc/B49L-SRQP] (showing RFID chip application in action).
105
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temperature, and delays. Similar to modern-day John Deere tractors,
which incorporate satellite technology for precision agriculture,110
the world’s commercial transportation infrastructure could
incorporate analogous technology to capitalize on the IoT and
increase producer-consumer transparency. With this wealth of data
at their fingertips, how could regulators, retailers, restaurants, and
most importantly, consumers use the data stored on AgChain?
Because of the adaptability of blockchain as a platform for
information management, mobilizing the data can host a variety of
benefits, as seen in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: A Decentralized AgChain Can Provide Shared Benefit to A
Variety of Users111
110
Laura Hall, How NASA and John Deere Helped Tractors Drive Themselves,
NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/directorates/spacetech/spinoff/john_deere
[https://perma.cc/9B4L-RQY9] (Apr. 20, 2018).
111
Adnan Imeri & Djamel Khadraoui, The Security and Traceability of Shared
Information in the Process of Transportation of Dangerous Goods, 9TH IFIP
INT’L CONF. ON NEW TECH., MOBILITY & SEC. (NTMS) 1, 4 (2018).
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B. Adaptability of Blockchains Using Layering—dApps &
eContracts
In addition to the inherent advantages of blockchains and P2P
computing, adding “layers” to interface with data on the blockchain
will turn the ledger into a powerful tool. Layering interface
applications over raw data will make the ledger’s data indexable and
referenceable, allowing the identities of supply chain participants
and exchanged commodities to be pinpointed quickly.112 These
interface layers in AgChain would include decentralized
applications (“dApps”), as well as electronic contracts
(“eContracts”) since these layers provide the most utility for a
supply chain system like agriculture.113
dApps, or applications with an interface disbursed and
decentralized on the blockchain, would incorporate everything from
creating user profiles for producers, distributors, retailers, and
regulators to collecting data from sensors embedded throughout the
supply chain.114 Sensors throughout the IoT would become a
powerful tool for regulators to test water quality, monitor
temperature for produce in shipping trucks, and assess humidity in
storage units.115 Artificial intelligence (“AI”) programs with
machine learning could preemptively identify risk factors likely to
cause disease,116 marking a valuable shift in how FoodNet currently

112
Sidra Malik et al., TrustChain: Trust Management in Blockchain and IoT
Supported Supply Chains, in 2019 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON BLOCKCHAIN 184, 187
(2019).
113
Id. at 188; see Imeri & Khadraoui, supra note 111, at 4 (outlining as an
example, three layers on a supply chain blockchain: the data layer, the blockchain
layer, and the application layer); see also Massner, supra note 54, at 349–50
(explaining the interrelationship between eContracts and dApps when using
blockchain infrastructure).
114
See Massner, supra note 54, at 350 (showing the versatility of incorporating
eContracts in dApp layering on a blockchain).
115
Id.
116
For a more thorough discussion of machine learning and pattern recognition,
see Ming Xue & Changjun Zhu, A Study and Application on Machine Learning
of Artificial Intelligence, in INT’L JOINT CONF. ON A.I. (2009).
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operates.117 Figure 2 below illustrates the various roles that the layers
serve when dApps run over blockchain networks.118

Figure 2: Layers Transform Blockchains from a Compilation of Data
into a Usable Tool119

By including digital and self-executing eContracts throughout
the application layer, the agricultural sector can increase efficiency

117

See supra Part II.A (discussing FoodNet).
Malik et al., supra note 112, at 186.
119
Id.
118
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through automation.120 This automation would reduce unnecessary
labor and help offset some of the costs of operating on the
blockchain.121 Additionally, pre-designated data values can prompt
independently executable scripts.122 An example would be a
payment disbursement from a retailer to a distributor prompted by
the distributor’s shipping truck entering a predefined geographic
area, such as a retailer’s store or warehouse (detected through
RFID). Similarly, a consumer could look to these eContracts and
their underlying data to verify retailers conforming to ethical
standards.123
The idea of using applications to create an intuitive, userfriendly interface for the technical novice is a well-established
technological norm in many countries.124 In fact, the entire basis for
modern computing—using a cursor to select icons and open
executable files—was driven by the desire to make computing
power more accessible to non-coders.125 A similar motivation lies
behind the innovation of cell phone applications, blurring the lines
between computer and smartphone and resulting in near-full access
to the internet using one pocket-sized device.126 Similarly, cell phone
applications can be used to access data on AgChain merely by

120

See Christidis & Devetsikiotis, supra note 106, at 2301.
See Malik et al., supra note 112, at 185 (explaining how an automated
framework reduces overhead and increases the scalability of blockchain’s
utilization of supply chains).
122
See Christidis & Devetsikiotis, supra note 106, at 2296.
123
See generally Massner, supra note 54, at 353 (outlining regulatory
transparency in light of several stakeholders, such as farmers, packers, bakers,
retailers, and restaurants). This same regulatory transparency is easily translatable
to ethical transparency to the consumer, because much of the underlying
information—location, sanitation, and work conditions—overlaps between
regulation and ethics. Id.
124
See Steven Levy, Graphical User Interface, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/technology/graphical-user-interface
[https://perma.cc/4WZC-ECGX] (Mar. 29, 2018) (explaining the origins of
graphical user interface or “GUI”).
125
Id.
126
See Matt Strain, 1983 to Today: A History of Mobile Apps, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2015/feb/13/
history-mobile-apps-future-interactive-timeline [https://perma.cc/MT4E-N5JC].
121
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connecting a cell phone application with a dApp on AgChain
itself.127
Imagine this hypothetical: Jack participates in his usual Sunday
ritual, going to the grocery store. To make more conscious and
ethical decisions while purchasing his favorite foods, Jack
downloads an app to his smartphone for a nominal fee. This app uses
his phone’s near-field communication reader to scan the grocery
store’s information kiosk for a banana. At Jack’s fingertips, the
programmed identifier in the kiosk instantly reports the banana’s
history from AgChain—the field that grew the banana, the hands
that harvested it, the ethical rating of the employer, and the
transportation time and conditions between the field and the grocery
store. The transparency now available to Jack via AgChain will
empower Jack to make ad hoc, value-based determinations; for
example, whether saving a few dollars is worth purchasing produce
connected to child labor or unfair working conditions.
Because the power of the dollar in a free market is much like
casting a ballot in an election, informed decisions regarding
exercised spending power are vital to fostering ethical business
practices.128 Some might doubt consumers’ engagement in holding
producers accountable; however, the media, nonprofits, and retailers
interested in protecting their reputations will certainly serve as a
check.129 Finally, regulators can track products throughout the entire
127

This AgChain app would operate the same way a cell phone application
provides a convenient interface for bank account or transit information. See, e.g.,
Alex Lielacher, How to Access DApps on Your Mobile Phone, CRYPTO BASICS
(Nov. 20, 2020), https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/article/how-to-accessdapps-on-your-mobile-phone [https://perma.cc/T3V5-LZS8] (“To use Ethereum
DApps, users require an Ethereum wallet that can interact with smart contracts.
An example would be Trust Wallet, which enables users to seamlessly interact
with decentralized applications on desktop and mobile.”).
128
Whizy Kim, How to Find Out What Causes a Company Supports Before You
Shop, REFINERY29, https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/where-does-money-goshopping-tools [https://perma.cc/J95W-JNUH] (July 7, 2020) (highlighting the
questions posed by ethical consumerism and why it matters).
129
See generally Bob Young, The Relationship Between Supermarkets and
Suppliers: What Are the Implications for Consumers?, CONSUMERS INT’L. 4 (July
2020),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_relationship_between_
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supply chain and initiate safety interventions in a manner similar to
Jack. Transparency to this extent was lost long ago amidst the
expansion of global supply chains,130 but deploying blockchain and
layering dApps for interface would revitalize confidence and control
in agriculture.
IV. PRELIMINARY OBSTACLES FOR IMPLEMENTING A
BLOCKCHAIN SOLUTION
Equipping AgChain to sufficiently execute the aforementioned
goals faces two key barriers.131 First, while cryptocurrencies—the
most widely used blockchains today—operate by storing relatively
small amounts of information on their blocks, AgChain would
require substantially more data.132 Blockchain data must be
physically stored somewhere, which is both costly to establish and
requires manpower to maintain, even if the data is located on a
decentralized set of servers in “the cloud.”133 Second, utilizing the
supermarkets_and_suppliers.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWH5-A9CQ] (“In the trade
of agricultural products, the bargaining power of the supermarkets is reinforced
by fragmentation on the supply side. Whereas the retail grocery market is
characteristically served by only four or five large supermarket groups, the
number of food and food-product producers runs into thousands. The fragmented
nature of the supply side tilts bargaining power even further in favour of the
supermarkets.”).
130
See supra Part II (discussing the current state of agriculture).
131
Natalya Dyatko, No, You Don’t Store Data on the Blockchain – Here’s Why,
JAXENTER (Dec. 16, 2019), https://jaxenter.com/blockchain-data-164727.html
[https://perma.cc/B9AF-245N]; see also Ron Lyseng, Big Farm vs. Small Farm:
Survival of the Fittest, W. PRODUCER (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.producer.
com/news/big-farm-vs-small-farm-survival-of-the-fittest/
[https://perma.cc/BF5CD9KQ] (“A big farmer benefits from economy of scale in making purchases. He also
benefits from a substantial cash flow, which allows him to always use the latest
technology . . ..”).
132
Dyatko, supra note 131.
133
Tonglai Liu et al., Secure and Balanced Scheme for Non-local Data Storage
in Blockchain Network, IEEE 21ST INT’L CONF. ON HIGH PERFORMANCE
COMPUTING & COMMC’NS 2424, 2424 (2019) (explaining that when portions of a
blockchain are stored on the cloud, they are divided into encrypted data chunks).
When nodes are organized into a single Consensus Unit, and their disk space is
collected, storage space can be substantial. Id. This Article discusses a hybrid
approach where local and non-local combined storage are used to maximize
storage potential, security, and cost.

OCT. 2021]

AgChain

149

full power of a blockchain would inherently benefit those with the
most access to technology.134 Thus, many small, rural farmers would
potentially be excluded due to their lower participation levels in the
IoT, while larger competitors would flourish.135
A. Data Storage on a Large Scale is Expensive
Data storage on blockchains has proven exceptional in theory;
however, data storage capabilities in the physical world limit
seamless implementation.136 To make AgChain a reality, substantial
investment in data storage capabilities is necessary.137 Presently, the
cost of data nodes for one petabyte of storage (one million
gigabytes) is approximately $1,000,000.138 By comparison, the cost
of running only a mile of electrical transmission lines ranges from
approximately $285,000 to $1,000,000.139 Both are certainly
expensive and are only a small fraction of the total network
necessary to create an appreciable public benefit for each of the two
industries.140

134

Lyseng, supra note 131 (“A big farmer benefits from economy of scale in
making purchases. He also benefits from a substantial cash flow, which allows
him to always use the latest technology.”).
135
Peter B. R. Hazell, Is there a Future for Small Farms?, 32 AGRIC. ECON. 93,
94 (2005).
136
Dyatko, supra note 131; see also Gabriela Motroc, Running Blockchains in
the Cloud: Benefits & Lessons Learned, JAXENTER (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://jaxenter.com/blockchain-cloud-interview-kuhlman-153287.html
[https://perma.cc/52UB-VJ72] (highlighting data storage limitations as an
obstacle to scaling blockchain).
137
Eric Savitz, The Cost of Big Data, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/04/16/the-big-cost-of-bigdata/?sh=1634dbc85a3b [https://perma.cc/32KE-FBX7].
138
Id.
139
Frank Alonso & Carolyn A. E. Greenwell, Underground vs. Overhead:
Powerline Installation-Cost Comparison and Mitigation, POWERGRID INT’L (Feb.
1, 2013), https://www.power-grid.com/td/underground-vs-overhead-power-lineinstallation-cost-comparison/#gref [https://perma.cc/J9XK-U277].
140
See id.; see also U.S. Electricity Grid & Markets, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/us-electricity-grid-markets#main-content
[https://perma.cc/DEB9-EHP7] (July 13, 2021) (reporting that there are 160,000
miles of high-voltage power lines, and millions of miles of lower voltage lines in
the United States).
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There have been efforts to increase data density that can be
stored in physical space by shifting away from conventional, binaryelectric methods and towards enzymatic-DNA-based storage.141
DNA-improved data density would replace traditional computing
“ones” and “zeros” with adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and
thymine (T), which make up DNA, thereby exponentially improving
the efficiency of data storage in physical spaces.142 Additionally,
quantum computing aims to perform data storage at the atomic
level.143 However, both of these revolutionary storage methods are
too underdeveloped to rely upon for immediate blockchain
implementation.144
Although these next-generation technologies will likely
continue to develop independent of conventional data storage
methods, the risks posed by the compromised state of agriculture in
the United States demands immediate action.145 Like the phasing out
of fossil fuels for energy generation that has occurred over time, a
similar obsoletion of binary, electronic data storage may occur in the
future.146 Still, possible innovation is no reason for stagnation in the

141

Robert F. Service, DNA Could Store All of the World’s Data in One Room,
SCI. MAG. (Mar. 2, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017
/03/dna-could-store-all-worlds-data-one-room [https://perma.cc/K9YN-DBXF].
142
Id. (“[R]esearchers report that they’ve come up with a new way to encode
digital data in DNA to create the highest-density large-scale data storage scheme
ever invented. Capable of storing 215 petabytes (215 million gigabytes) in a single
gram of DNA, the system could, in principle, store every bit of datum ever
recorded by humans in a container about the size and weight of a couple of pickup
trucks.”).
143
See generally Thomas Beth, Quantum Computing: An Introduction, IEEE
INT’L SYMP. ON CIRS. & SYS. 1 (2000) (discussing the two concepts of
“superposition” and “entangled states” as the tools for implementing quantum
computing).
144
For a comprehensive analysis DNA-based data storage, see THE FUTURE OF
DNA DATA STORAGE, POTOMAC INST. FOR POL’Y STUDS. 24–27 (2018),
https://potomacinstitute.org/images/studies/Future_of_DNA_Data_Storage.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PYC-22NK].
145
See supra Part II (discussing on the current state of agriculture).
146
See Rainer Quitzow et al., Advancing a Global Transition to Clean Energy
– The Role of International Cooperation, 37 ECON. e-J. 1, 2 (2019).
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present.147 One could imagine how stunted human development
might have been if humanity decided to forego the necessary costs
to implement large-scale electric transmission.148 Because of these
marked similarities, a similar approach to electricity transmission
should be employed in digital supply chain infrastructure,
specifically, utility-scale data storage to host AgChain.
B. Balancing the Interests of Small Farmers and Large
Commercial Producers
Small and mid-sized farms contribute to nearly half of the
United States’ food productions.149 Observed at nearly 22% of total
food production, small farmers still account for a generous portion
of the United States’ agriculture.150 Despite this vital role for the
Nation, small farmers are being further jeopardized by large
commercial farms.151 Additionally, small farmers are more likely to
distrust new technology because its unfamiliarity and complexity
have resulted in companies’ past abuse and exploitation of those

147

See id. (“The global transition to clean energy has accelerated markedly over
the past decade. Renewable energy capacities have more than doubled over the
past ten years and represented 70 percent of net capacity additions in the power
sector in 2017.”).
148
Access to Energy is at the Heart of Development, WORLD BANK (Apr. 18,
2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/04/18/access-energysustainable-development-goal-7 [https://perma.cc/4G8P-9UYK] (“[Lack of
electricity] represents a fundamental barrier to progress for a sizeable proportion
of the world’s population, and has impacts on a wide range of development
indicators, including health, education, food security, gender equality,
livelihoods, and poverty reduction.”).
149
USDA, Farming and Farm Income, https://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/farming-and-farmincome/ [https://perma.cc/2K2U-D2PZ] (Dec. 2, 2020).
150
See id.
151
Alana Semuels, ‘They’re Trying to Wipe Us Off the Map.’ Small American
Farmers are Nearing Extinction, TIME MAG. (Nov. 27, 2019, 1:16 PM),
https://time.com/5736789/small-american-farmers-debt-crisis-extinction/
[https://perma.cc/CK2R-7EXF] (“The reason for these lowered prices are the twin
forces upending much of the American economy: technology and globalization.
Technology has made farms more efficient than ever before. But economies of
scale meant that most of the benefits accrued to corporate farmers, who built up
huge holdings as smaller farmers sold out.”).
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farmers.152 Unfortunately, AgChain is likely to be no different unless
intuitive and user-friendly interfaces can be implemented. Large
commercial farms have greater access to liquidity153 and are better
situated to deploy the distributed network of sensors and computers
to best utilize the IoT, deploy the AgChain, and offset costs, thereby
improving cash flow and initiating a self-perpetuating cycle. Due to
the fact that commercial farms would reduce regulatory inefficiency
through AgChain automation that small, low-tech farmers could not
take advantage of, small farms would be left behind, saddled with
the in-person regulatory burdens of today.154 Finally, insurance
companies might note the value of AgChain-enabled risk mitigation
and reward those implementing the system.155 By reducing the
likelihood of claims and lawsuits through AgChain’s advantages,
insurance underwriters would likely view an AgChain user as a
lower risk.156 While this could improve adoption rates, the small
152

See Todd Janzen, Sorry, Right to Repair Advocates: You May Be Right, but
John Deere is on the Winning Side of History, JANZEN AG TECH BLOG (Mar. 31,
2017), https://www.aglaw.us/janzenaglaw/2017/3/29/fixing-the-right-to-repair
[https://perma.cc/QK6B-LUA8] (exploring the Right to Repair Movement,
prompted by farmers who invested in John Deere tractors, only to be forced to
pay expensive transportation and technician costs due to inaccessible, proprietary
interface software for their tractors); see also AgFunder, Ag Tech is Useless if We
Can’t Engage Farmers, SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://www.agriculture.com/news/technology/ag-tech-is-useless-if-we-cantengage-farmers [https://perma.cc/RNL5-X48G] (“[A]g tech entrepreneurs have
been forcing half-baked products on farmers. Nothing good comes of this; farmers
are left frustrated, skeptical of ag tech, and feeling they have been burned. Ag tech
entrepreneurs fail to receive valuable feedback that will help them build better
products.”).
153
Lyseng, supra note 131.
154
See supra Part II.A (discussing the current regulatory processes in
agriculture).
155
Lynn F. Kime et al., Product Liability Insurance, PENN ST. EXTENSION
(Sept. 8, 2018), https://extension.psu.edu/product-liability-insurance#:~:text=
Product%20liability%20insurance%20provides%20protection,from%20consum
ption%20of%20your%20product. [https://perma.cc/9KUS-ZQT5] (“Product
liability insurance provides protection if a food borne illness results from a
product you sold. It will pay for injuries and medical treatment resulting from
consumption of your product. In addition to addressing the needs of your
customers, this coverage will also pay your defense costs in a lawsuit, and any
judgments of the court, up to the policy limit.”).
156
See id.
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farmers unable to adopt AgChain may face higher insurance
premiums than their competitors.157
On the other hand, small producers are operationally distinct
from their big-farm counterparts. For example, small producers
often have shorter supply chains and do not experience the
inefficiencies or obscurities that necessitate a technological solution
for complex, international producers.158 Small farmers generally
retain the short, local supply chains that inherently provide
assurances and foster confidence in consumers.159 Accountability
can be administered on a far less onerous, localized basis.160
Similarly, because agriculture is an economy of scale, and the small
farmer’s footprint is reduced, insurance premiums are inherently
lower to start.161 Small farmers may even see premiums decrease
following the implementation of AgChain, regardless of their
participation, as surgical interception of contaminated products
would necessitate smaller payouts for smaller recalls.162
V. INCENTIVIZING INVESTMENT BY DESIGNATING ONE OR MORE
BLOCKCHAIN FIRMS AS A UTILITY
AgChain is not the first socially necessary capital investment in
American history that was not immediately embraced by
157

See, e.g., John M. Vincent & Cherise Threewitt, How Do Those Car
Insurance Tracking Devices Work?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.usnews.com/insurance/auto/how-do-those-car-insurance-trackingdevices-work [https://rb.gy/hkpyxo] (demonstrating how fleet-based service
providers are already lowering premiums using GPS technology in cars to
demonstrate low-risk behavior to insurance providers).
158
See supra Part II (discussing the current state of complex agricultural supply
chains).
159
Eric Westervelt, As Food Supply Chain Breaks Down, Farm-To-Door CSAs
Take Off, NPR (May 10, 2020, 10:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/10/
852512047/as-food-supply-chain-breaks-down-farm-to-door-csas-take-off
[https://perma.cc/NCM9-SKYJ].
160
Id.
161
Patrick J. Kiger, 10 Ways the Transcontinental Railroad Changed America,
HISTORY (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/transcontinentalrailroad-changed-america [https://perma.cc/6A3D-JYKW].
162
See generally Kime et al., supra note 155 (highlighting how the cost of
injury and lawsuits drive premium costs in product liability cases).
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entrepreneurs.163 Railroads and powerlines, for instance, were not
attractive because immense feats of ingenuity and investment were
required to accomplish their intended purposes; however, both
investments connected the continent in a way many before deemed
unimaginable.164 The government provided assurances, like
exclusive service territories, to persuade capitalists to invest in these
risky and expensive endeavors.165 Similarly, AgChain’s high costs
of entry into the market would require incentivization to make
“buying in” more appealing to investors. Subpart A below discusses
the processes by which capital investment may be incentivized
through designating AgChain as a utility. Subpart B discusses the
benefits and obligations inherent to regulated utilities. Finally,
Subpart C concludes by explaining the primary criticisms of the
regulated utility model.
A. Defining the Incentive to Private Enterprise
Two different, yet complementary, approaches can incentivize
capital investments in light of natural monopolies. This Article
proposes a regulated utility solution to resolve the barrier to entry
posed by expensive capital investment—essentially combining the
two approaches.166 The first strategy involves the government
163
Peter J. Gould, Administrative Law - The Constitutional Limits of the Power
to Regulate: Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 20 N.M. L. REV. 199, 205 (1990)
(stating that the electricity industry was a natural monopoly requiring regulation
in-part because “the high initial cost of starting a facility for electric generation
discourages newcomers from getting into the market”).
164
See The Transcontinental Railroad, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/
collections/railroad-maps-1828-to-1900/articles-and-essays/history-of-railroadsand-maps/the-transcontinental-railroad/ [https://perma.cc/SEK7-KSSK]; see also
Julie Cohn, When the Grid Was the Grid: The History of North America’s Brief
Coast-to-Coast Interconnected Machine, 107 PROC. OF THE IEEE 232, 237 (2019)
(“[Establishing the electricity grid] was an engineering accomplishment of the
highest order, first envisioned in the early twentieth century, touted by politicians
and contemplated by engineers for decades, and finally achieved—nearly
undetected by the American public—in 1967.”).
165
See generally Gould, supra note 163, at 212 (explaining the ratemaking
process as a balancing act between consumer and investor interests).
166
Because the barrier to entry for a complex data storage system like AgChain
and similar data systems modernizing supply chains is largely an economic
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rewarding an innovator for investment by protecting a return on the
investment.167 The protection includes factoring the innovation cost
into the rate base charged for services provided by the utility to
provide modest assurances that capital is recuperated.168 The second
strategy to incentivize investment amidst high entry costs requires
the government to protect the innovator from competition by
excluding market access to competitors in a specific geographic area
for a prescribed period of time.169 Combining both of these
strategies—adopting a reasonable rate of return, as well as granting
an exclusive service territory—to incentivize AgChain innovators is
the best approach to building the infrastructure for mass blockchain
data storage.170 Advancing technologies, such as DNA-based data
storage and quantum computing, render present investment in largescale data storage risky, but these risks are no different from the

hurdle, another solution, which this paper does not explore, is the possible
effectiveness of tax credits and subsidies. See, e.g., David Roberts, RECs, Which
Put the “Green” in Green Electricity, Explained, VOX (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://www.vox.com/2015/11/9/9696820/renewable-energy-certificates
[https://perma.cc/F3EH-8F8V] (discussing applications for renewable energy
credits in the electricity industry). Using these vehicles to reduce the net cost of
implementing a complex and independent data storage system could possibly be
as effective as a regulated utility; however, the nature of having all related data
tied to a single blockchain means that the coding and encryption must be one
single version—a monopoly. See supra Part III (explaining that node miners on a
blockchain must share the same ledger and be able to communicate with one
another). Unlike the tangible natural monopolies seen in electric transmission and
railroad tracks, this AgChain version is a new iteration of the natural monopoly:
a virtual, natural monopoly.
167
See generally James J. Hoecker, “Used and Useful”: Autopsy of a
Ratemaking Policy, 8 ENERGY L.J. 303, 303 (1987) (explaining that “used and
useful” capital investments by a utility should be recuperated in the rate of return,
but this recuperation may not directly correlate to original cost if some capital is
not being used or is not useful to the public).
168
Id. at 306.
169
See Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electric Utility Regulation, 43
FLA ST. U. L. REV. 135, 143 (2015) (“In exchange for an exclusive service
territory, the utility is subject to rate regulation by the state [public utility
commission].”).
170
See Hoecker, supra note 167, at 306.
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energy sector’s evolution in the United States.171 Considering the
urgent public need for food security and protection,172 AgChain must
be created and implemented now, so that looming tragedy from
devastating hacks, foodborne pathogens, and ongoing food waste is
addressed and avoided.
The blended benefits of a regulated, reasonable rate of return for
an AgChain investor with the benefits of an exclusive service
territory, would incentivize private companies to develop the
necessary data-storage infrastructure upon which AgChain would
operate.173 To establish a utility rate, regulators would need to be
cognizant of the AgChain’s revenue requirements and the
consumers’ need for “just and reasonable” rates.174 Just and
reasonable rates require a delicate balancing of interests that is
highly fact-specific; in other rate-setting instances, courts have
mandated an “end-results” test that focuses less on the means of
setting the rate and more on the “end,” so long as the outcome is just
and reasonable.175 AgChain’s ratepayers, such as farmers,
supermarkets, and consumers, would be entitled to a similarly just
and reasonable rate.
AgChain will attract capital from potential investors because of
the stability AgChain will enjoy in the market due to the balancing
of investor and ratepayer interests.176 Additionally, balancing the
interests of the ratepayer ensures that those using AgChain are only
paying for the benefits the ratepayers enjoy and ensures that the
171

See supra Part IV.A (discussing innovative data storage technologies
besides blockchain); see also Gould, supra note 163, at 202–03 (discussing the
efficacy of advancing nuclear electricity technology post-WWII).
172
For a discussion regarding over-inclusive food recalls and data hacks, see
supra Part II.A.
173
See Gustavus H. Robinson, Duty of a Public Utility to Serve at Reasonable
Rates: The Valuation War, 6 N.C. L. REV. 243 (1928).
174
Gould, supra note 163, at 212 (quoting the Court in Fed. Power Comm'n v.
Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) regarding the End Results Test for
energy utility rate setting and stating, “[t]he rate-making process under the Act,
i.e., the fixing of ‘just and reasonable’ rates, involves a balancing of the investor
and the consumer interests.”).
175
Id. at 206, 212.
176
Id. at 211 (noting how investors want to rely on a “predictable and steady”
return on investment).
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utility is fulfilling its primary purpose of meeting a public need.177
Using a process called “amortization,” the original investors in
AgChain will be ensured to recover their costs over a determined
amount of time.178 However, for this ability to recuperate costs to be
meaningful, AgChain innovators must be assured that competitors
will not enter the same market space.
To properly set the scope of the competition prohibition,
regulations must identify the geographic and market boundaries for
the exclusive service territory.179 Failure to correctly identify the
scope of an exclusive service territory could result in over- or underinclusive sections of the free-market being restricted for a utility illsuited to fill the space.180 As a best practice in utility regulation,
exclusive service territories need only extend to the scope of the
natural monopoly itself because that scope is the extent to which
high capital costs block entry and cause market failure.181 Stated
177
See id. (emphasizing that the value in removing speculative capital
investment-related risk reduces the cost experienced by the consumer ratepayer).
178
Id. at 201 n.20 (defining amortization).
179
Monast, supra note 169, at 143 (explaining that an exclusive service territory
is the benefit a utility gains for subjecting itself to rate regulation by the state
utility commission). This exchange of benefits, which includes the power of
eminent domain and the right to exclude others from its territory, has historically
been dubbed the regulatory compact between a company and the government. See
id.; see also Jim Rossi, The Common Law Duty to Serve and Protection of
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1263–64 (1998) (defining a regulatory compact).
180
This result was seen when the United States fumbled while developing the
adequate scope of natural gas regulation jurisdiction, alternating between treating
pipelines, well-heads, and distributors as regulated monopolies, despite the fact
that only the transportation pipelines were sensibly a natural monopoly. See
William Flittie & James Armour, The Natural Gas Experience – A Study in
Regulatory Aggression and Congressional Failure to Control the Legislative
Process, 19 SW. L.J. 448, 522 (1965) (“[I]ndirect controls which force nonjurisdictional sales into jurisdictional status, if to be made at all, benefit those in
the industry who otherwise would be bypassed and would not participate in the
business represented.”).
181
See
Thomas
Brock,
Natural
Monopoly,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/natural_monopoly.asp [https://perma.cc/
N5EV-86TS] (Jan. 26, 2021) (defining a natural monopoly as “when one firm is
much more efficient than multiple firms in providing the good or service to the
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differently, when circumstances no longer generate natural
monopolies, the need for a regulated utility evaporates because
traditional market forces are expected to operate effectively.182 In
AgChain, the scope of the natural monopoly would extend to both
the physical infrastructure network established, as well as the
virtual, natural monopoly that is the AgChain code. The competitive
retail sale of storage on blockchains, like AgChain, may even
operate similarly to the retail sales of electricity often deemed not to
be a natural monopoly; however, such a discussion is outside of the
scope of this Article.183
By combining rate regulation and an exclusive service territory
for investors in AgChain, reluctance to assume the high costs of
entering the big data storage market will likely be abated. This
combination will allow the implementation of AgChain and the
design of dApps for user and regulator interfaces. The software
implementations for AgChain is another cost that must be assumed,
but both the tangible and intangible infrastructure may be recovered
in the rates charged.184 Finally, at the later stages of implementation,
the utility could be expected to add an AI layer that would recognize
problematic data or supply chain issues likely to cause outbreaks or
other disruptions and relay those warnings to regulators and the
market. A good example of this is in the business of electricity transmission where
once a grid is set up to deliver electric power to all of the homes in a community,
putting in a second, redundant grid to compete makes little sense.”).
182
See id.
183
See, e.g., Scott Patterson & Tom McGinty, Deregulation Aimed to Lower
Home-Power Bills. For Many, It Didn’t., WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/electricity-deregulation-utility-retail-energy-bills11615213623 [https://perma.cc/A9QR-2HWA]. Many regions in the United
States have shifted away from the utility model for electricity and now use
regional competitive markets for wholesale transactions. See Benjamin A.
Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy Systems: Policy
Implementation, Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission
Organizations, 21 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 222, 226 (2016). These competitive
markets are called Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”); RTOs value
the competitive market as a tool to promote innovation, reliability, low rates, and
shared energy resources between states. Id.
184
See, e.g., Lielacher, supra note 127 (demonstrating the use of dApps on
Ethereum’s blockchain). These dApps could charge rates to ratepayers as a simple
access fee.
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affected parties.185 With these combined technologies, AgChain
would be poised to fulfill the modernization of the food supply
chain.
B. A Duty to Serve
Another critical tenant of utility regulation is the utility’s duty to
serve the general public.186 The duty to serve means the utility is not
allowed to refuse service, so long as its ratepayers have the ability
to pay the regulator-approved rate charged and the utility has the
capacity to serve.187 For electric utilities, a duty to serve is met by
fulfilling all demand for electricity at the rate approved by its
regulator; for AgChain, the duty to serve is met by allowing
ratepayers to utilize the blockchain’s data storage system, dApps,
and all other services provided. The duty to serve renders utilities
distinct from other private enterprises that may generally refuse to
serve customers so long as the basis for refusal is not
discriminatory.188 Because of its duty to serve, the utility is expected
to expand and maintain its capabilities to support ratepayer
demand—ultimately serving the public need as intended.189 If the
utility fails to satisfy its duty, the utility can be subjected to
demanding scrutiny regarding its business operations; if the breach
of this duty is sufficient, the utility may face losing the benefits of a

185

See supra Part III.B (discussing software layering on the blockchain).
Rossi, supra note 179, at 1243 (explaining the duty to serve as consisting of
two distinct obligations in the twentieth century: Service Extension & Service
Continuation).
187
But see id. (explaining that in some instances, the utility may even be
prevented from disconnecting services when the ratepayer cannot pay). This has
been seen as of late when many governors issued moratoriums on utility
companies from discontinuing service during the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g.,
N.C. Exec. Order No. 142 (2020) (extending a utility shutoff prohibition
previously ordered by Governor Roy Cooper).
188
Rossi, supra note 179, at 1319 (“The duty to serve applicable to public
utilities, this Article suggests, has been much more rigorous than obligations that
attach to other private property or businesses.”).
189
Id. at 1252–57 (explaining the Duty to Extend Service, which is a subset of
the Duty to Serve).
186
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regulatory compact, most importantly, its exclusive service
territory.190
AgChain is not intended to dictate the actions of farmers or
manage the supply chain itself; instead, the same farmers and
managers would continue to oversee American agriculture, aided by
regulators. AgChain would operate solely as a data management
service, satisfying the logistical needs of farmers, supermarkets,
regulators, and consumers. Just as consumers’ rates on the electric
grid may vary by consumer type (e.g., industrial, commercial, or
residential), the rate AgChain charges for its data management
services would vary depending on the type of consumer.191 For
example, Jack would pay a one-time access fee on his phone for
downloading an application from the App store, whereas farmers
and markets using AgChain to automate contract executions and
payments would pay a recurring service rate based on usage. To
encourage early adoption of AgChain, the rate would be offset by
insurance savings, tax deductions for business-related expenses, and
potential government subsidies to encourage early adoption of
AgChain.192 Furthermore, AgChain would be expected to expand its
190
Id. at 1263–64 (“The regulatory compact, a fictional contract between the
utility and the state, views the utility as consensually agreeing to certain
obligations, such as the duty to serve, in return for its geographic franchise and
expected recovery of its costs of service through regulated rates.”). This fictional,
or implied contract, sensibly prompts revocation of the benefit under the contract
when breached.
191
Industrial, commercial, and residential consumers often pay different rates
when buying electricity. This price discrepancy can be conceptualized by
industrial or commercial consumers essentially paying in bulk for their electricity,
thereby paying a lower unit price per kilowatt-hour. See Electricity Explained
Factors Affecting Electricity Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/prices-and-factors-affectingprices.php [https://perma.cc/3TWF-5AK9] (Apr. 12, 2021).
192
Instead of individual consumers paying the direct cost of AgChain operation
through in-app purchases, a much more likely scenario is that a supermarket
would subsume this cost and then pass the cost on to consumers through a minor
price increase on goods sold. This rate increase would be quite similar to the fees
Amazon charges its Amazon Prime customers for its two-day shipping. See The
Amazon Prime Membership Fee, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/
gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=G34EUPKVMYFW8N2U
[https://perma.cc/WK9X-M26W] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
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blockchain code, data storage capabilities, and maintain service
reliability to meet its duty to serve.193 If the farmer, the consumer, or
the market wants to employ AgChain’s data management services,
AgChain would have an obligation to serve. By fostering AgChain’s
infrastructural development, America’s vital data management,
security, and agricultural regulatory needs could be met.194
Improving regulatory oversight will reduce food waste, promote
proactive policing of foodborne pathogens, and modernize
regulation in a vital American industry. Despite criticisms
surrounding utility regulation, AgChain is still the best option.
C. Criticisms—Is a Utility the Right Direction?
While many American marvels are the byproduct of a regulated
utility system (e.g., railroads, telecommunication, and electricity),
combining private enterprise innovation with public regulation has
its fair share of flaws.195 These flaws have vexed regulators in the
electricity sector, attempting to reorganize markets in ways that
minimize regulatory intrusion on the free market.196 Borrowing some
of the lessons learned in energy market restructuring, AgChain
regulation may be more narrowly tailored to support data
management infrastructure needs (a natural monopoly) while
allowing the wholesale and retail sales of data storage space on
AgChain as a competitive market. The competitive market on
AgChain’s storage space could include bidding and opposing
businesses promoting innovation.197 Nonetheless, stifled innovation
is an ongoing concern in any regulated market; additionally, the
193

See Rossi, supra note 179, at 1319.
See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 50 (illustrating an E. coli outbreak that may
have been avoided if AgChain were operational).
195
See David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs.
Practice, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 418 (2005) (explaining the twofold case
for restructuring electric grids to create purely competitive markets).
196
See id.
197
See id. (explaining that the sale of electricity is not a natural monopoly).
This process is comparable to the fact that the sales of data space on AgChain
would not be a natural monopoly. See id.; see also Sofia Ranchordas, InnovationFriendly Regulation: The Sunset of Regulation, the Sunrise of Innovation, 55
JURIMETRICS 201, 201 (2015) (advocating for more regulatory flexibility in light
of lagging regulation slowing down innovation).
194
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issues of regulatory capture and alternative market mechanisms
attempt to decrease utility appeal.198
Promoting AgChain would not result in data storage innovation
stagnation. Many everyday media applications exist that promote
improved data storage.199 For example, improved data storage means
that individuals can store 4K versions of their favorite movies on
their cell phones to watch on an intercontinental flight instead of the
standard definition version.200 Additionally, computer software is
growing more complex and therefore demands better processing
power and quick data storage.201 These common, personal uses for
improved data storage would fuel innovation, and an AgChain
utility would not interfere with that independent motivation for
innovation in other personal technological purposes.
A second common obstacle for utility success, particularly from
a consumer’s perspective, is the issue of regulatory capture.202
Regulatory capture occurs when a utility accrues enough influence
in government (specifically, the agencies charged with regulating
the utility) such that regulation no longer effectively imitates the
pressures of a free market.203 Essentially, agencies start to favor the
regulated entity disproportionately to consumers. Regulatory
capture can compromise the effectiveness of regulation, resulting in
dilapidated infrastructure, decreased reliability, and unfairly inflated
198

See Rossi, supra note 179, at 1274 (explaining regulatory capture incentives
for stakeholders).
199
See,
e.g.,
Data
Storage
Devices,
FRONTIER
INTERNET,
https://www.frontierinternet.com/gateway/data-storage-timeline/
[https://rb.gy/yvsxt7] (last visited May 15, 2021) (demonstrating the various
media applications for personal data storage on phones, flash drives, DVDs, etc.).
200
A single hour of 4K video is 14 gigabytes of data, compared to 0.7 gigabytes
per hour for a standard definition video. Stephen Kota, How Much Data Does 4K
Video Use, EVD DEPOT USA, https://www.evdodepotusa.com/how-much-datadoes-4k-video-streaming-use/ [https://perma.cc/U6KZ-5QUC] (last visited Feb. 8
2021). Accordingly, the Lord of the Rings movie, at 3 hours and 48 minutes,
would be 53.2 gigabytes of 4K video, but only 2.66 gigabytes of standard
definition video. LORD OF THE RINGS (Peter Jackson dir., 2001).
201
See supra Part IV (discussing DNA-based computing and other
technological advancements in quantum computing).
202
See Rossi, supra note 179, at 1274.
203
See id.
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rates.204 Nevertheless, merely recognizing that private enterprise has
a tenacious tendency to seek out improper governmental influence
is not unique to regulated monopolies.205 Improper corporate
lobbying power manifests in various governmental facets; however,
this unfortunate tendency does not foreclose the actual advantages
in a democratic system of government.206 Similarly, the prevalent
advantages of public utility regulation should not be blindly ignored
purely due to potential regulatory capture. Instead, vigilance via
consumer involvement should police for improper influence, so that
the benefits of utility regulation may be enjoyed without defects.
Finally, another outstanding criticism against a utility model for
AgChain lies in the potential for monetary subsidies granted to the
private company leading innovation.207 One might propose that
government subsidies would reduce the cost of creating AgChain in
a way that renders utility regulation pointless, particularly since the
high capital costs for entering the commercial data storage market
are a critical problem.208 This point still fails to address two
advantages in a utility model: (1) preventing wastefully redundant
infrastructure held by market competitors and (2) creating a unified
code that collectively creates a more secure AgChain. The value of
AgChain as a supply chain tool lies in its ability to amass
agricultural data from the IoT on a single system and cohesively and
coherently deploy that data for consumers and regulators to use. By
merely providing financial means for many new market participants,
204

See Gerard Caprio Jr., Regulatory Capture: Why It Occurs, How to Minimize
It, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 39, 47–48 (2013) (illustrating how regulatory capture
contributes to the breakdown of effective finance regulation); see also id. at 48
(“As professors, we know that if we let our classes grade themselves, it would be
rare for anyone to obtain a grade below A.”).
205
Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-democracy/390822/
[https://perma.cc/V583-NPQ7].
206
Id.
207
See generally Roberts, supra note 166 (demonstrating that tax credits, an
example of pure financial subsidies, are a means to incentivize renewable energy
production, which could be mirrored for blockchain innovation).
208
See generally Ranchordas, supra note 197 (emphasizing regulatory
flexibility as a means to foster innovation).
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the ability to create a single viable blockchain is undermined, since
the accumulation of data on a single, shared ledger is essential in
P2P systems operating a blockchain. Therefore, a utility model is
best suited for AgChain.209
VI. CONCLUSION
Implementing a blockchain-based solution to the United States’
agricultural supply chain would curb transparency and regulatory
issues and would prove favorable to consumers and farmers alike.
Additionally, employing AgChain to modernize the agricultural
supply chain benefits regulators, farmers, and consumers by
increasing transparency and security. Although some feasible
alternatives to AgChain as a regulated utility present themselves
when analyzing AgChain from a purely economic stance, the natural
monopoly characteristics inherent in AgChain’s physical and virtual
infrastructure render a singular utility as the only viable option.
Although improved methods by which data may be stored might
develop in the future, the possibility of future innovation or
obsoletion is no excuse to wait idly in anticipation of positive
change. The hazards of reactive responses to food contamination
and cyberattacks continue to grow; COVID-19 and its variants are
clear examples of a virus’s power to end lives and cripple the global
economy. Therefore, immediate action is essential. Akin to the
electricity and telecommunication infrastructures of the twentieth
century, waiting for potential innovation is an insufficient excuse for
delaying present-day inaction. Had the United States waited to
develop interstate electricity transmission infrastructure,
anticipating the distributed generation capabilities of solar panels,
this Article may have instead been written using a typewriter and
read by candlelight. Now is the time to capitalize on the real
potential of blockchain programs using modern data storage
technology; now is the time to stoke private investment in AgChain
by rewarding venture capitalists on the avantgarde with assurances
attendant to a public utility.

209

See supra Part III (discussing blockchain operation).
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Illustration A: The IoT Creates an Intricate Web of Devices Speaking
Directly to One Another210

210

See Fernández-Caramés & Fraga-Lamas, supra note 76, at 32980.
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